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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to develop a comprehensive institutional analysis framework in studying bureaucratic 
behaviour in government agencies. Although the purpose is to outline a general framework for research, the 
focus will be on taking into account the specifics of the agencification process in states from Central and Eastern 
Europe.  The  paper  is  divided  into  three  sections.  In the first  section  I compare  various  neoinstitutionalist 
approaches in terms of analysing the processes and transformations in the institutional environment concerning 
government agencies as semi-autonomous bodies in state organization. I argue that the approach which has a 
greater potential in explaining the processes and transformations in the institutional environment in government 
agencies is rational choice institutionalism. The second section of this paper is focused on presenting several 
traditional bureaucratic models in studying bureaucratic behaviour, from the traditional approach to public 
choice  ones,  in  order  to  determine  their  possible  contribution  in  analysing  officials  behaviour  in  semi-
autonomous agencies. Using these and the institutional analysis framework sugested in the first section of this 
paper I will focus on developing a model for studying bureaucratic behaviour in government agencies. The final 
section of the paper will be focused on the possibility of using the institutional analysis framework for studying 
bureaucratic behaviour in government agencies in Central and Eastern Europe and the challenges presented.  
Keywords: agencification, new institutionalism, bureaucratic behaviour, bureau-shaping models, government 
agencies
Introduction
In this paper I focus on outlining an institutional analysis framework for government agencies 
in order to study bureaucratic behavior in these agencies. It should be noted that this study is part of a 
broader research on bureaucratic behavior and accountability in government agencies in Central and 
Eastern  Europe.  The  aim  in  this  study  is  to  provide  theoretical  tools  for  understanding  the 
agencification  process  in  general  and  how  the  behavior  of  bureaucrats  is  shaped  in  such  an 
environment.  
I chose this topic due to its importance in understanding the complexity of the institutional 
design  in  the  case  of  government  agencies.  Although  there  are  several  studies  concerning  the 
agencification  process,  they  lack  theoretical  and  methodological  tools  in  order  to  establish  a 
comprehensive analysis of bureaucratic behaviour in govenment agencies. In respect to the literature 
available on the agencification process, there are several empirical studies well known for focusing 
on how agencies are formed and how they are developing in Western democracies. Therefore, there 
is an abundant empirical data for consolidated democracies (i.e Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Pollitt et al., 
2005), but few on countries that face the democratization process. Hence, there are not many study 
cases for states from Central and Eastern Europe, and those that are available are more focused on 
legal, political or economic aspects than on institutional changes brought by agencification
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Hence, in order to design a model for analyzing the behavior of bureaucrats in government 
agencies I will attempt to answer to the following questions: 1. What are government agencies and 
what are their characteristics?, 2. How to build an institutional analysis for government agencies?, 3. 
How  to  build a  model for  analyzing bureaucratic behavior  in  agencies,  taking  into  account  the 
importance of institutions in shaping actors’ behavior?  
1. An institutional analysis of government agencies 
Conceptualization and features of government agencies  
An approach able to provide a clarification of what constitutes a governmental agency must 
follow two directions, namely conceptualizing the term “agency” and a taxonomy of agencies.  
Agencies  in  the  current  studies  have  been  described  in  various  ways  such  as  quasi-
autonomous  public  organizations,  non-departmental  public  bodies,  non-autonomous  quasi-
governmental
2.
 Thus, the term agency received a multitude of meanings depending on the organizational 
culture, legal system and political system.
3 An argument that supports the idea that it is necessary to 
present a comprehensive and concise conceptualization of the term is brought by Pollitt and Talbot, 
which  highlight  two  issues  in  such  action.  First,  there  can  not  be  reached  a  universal  legal 
classification as national legal systems vary substantially from each other. Thus, both agencies and 
autonomous  bodies  may  present  any  possible  combination  between  public  law and  private  law. 
Secondly, it is difficult to achieve standardization of functional classifications of relations since the 
constitutional  and  political  system  varies  between  systems  that  have  a  tradition  of  ministerial 
accountability and the individual ministerial accountability and those who lack the concept, between 
systems where the appointing officials in autonomous public bodies is based on a political criteria 
and where this practice is less
4 .
Given the considerations above, I chose to use the approach of conceptualizing agencies 
following the characteristics proposed by Pollit and Talbot. According to the authors an agency is an 
organization which should have the following features:
5
1. to be as far away from the main chain of central ministries or departments of government;  
2. to perform tasks at the national level(eg service delivery, regulation, etc.).  
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3. employees are civil servants;  
4. to be financed mainly from state budget;  
5. to follow to a certain extent legal rules and public / administrative procedures.  
Following these characteristics Pollit and Talbot support the idea that there are three central 
elements of the agency, namely: structural disintegration and / or creating their own organizations 
with  specific  tasks,  contracting  performance  (here  the  reference  is  to  the  existence  of  a  set  of 
performance targets and a process of monitoring and reporting them), deregulation (or rather re-
regulation) in respect to the control regarding hiring employees, the budget and other issues related to 
management
6.
The characteristics above provide a context in which to place the concept of agency. Given 
the difficulties in  placing the  term of agency  in  a  comprehensive definition  that  would  help  in 
carrying out empirical research on a variety of possible cases, I chose to look at the term government 
agency within the proposed features and aspects outlined by Pollit and Talbot.  
I will follow the same logic presented in the preceding argument to discuss the definition of 
government  agency.  The  reason  is  that  the  purpose  of  this  study  does  not  concern  offering  a 
comprehensive conceptual framework on the term of government agency. For this reason I consider 
only the foundations necessary for understanding their significance in the governmental sector. Thus, 
I will discuss the features and elements proposed by Pollit and Talbot for agencies to establish the 
significance of government agencies.  
Regarding  the  specific  characteristics  of  agencies  in  general,  they  are  also  traits  that 
correspond to government agencies. However, I consider it necessary to emphasize two important 
aspects.
On the first feature concerning being as far away from the main chain of central ministries or 
departments of government, in respect  to the government agencies there has to  be a discussion 
regarding their degree of autonomy from the ministry. Laegried and Christensen argue that these 
agencies have some degree of autonomy from the ministries in areas such as policy development, 
decision-making process, hiring employees, budget and management issues. This does not mean they 
are totally independent. The reason is that the government has the ultimate responsibility for the 
actions of the agency
7. This observation is useful in analyzing the behavior of actors in government 
agencies, because it shows the importance of understanding the relationship between the bureau and 
the ministry and its impact on the behavior of bureaucrats. In other words, although government 
agencies are relatively distant from the ministerial ladder there may be penalties coming from the 
ministry in cases such as lower performance level. An example in this regard is the fact that in case 
of a low leve of performance the agency’s budget may be decreased.  
A second observation is related to the feature regarding the fact that employees of government 
agencies are civil servants. Although this is one of the characteristics of government agencies, it 
should be noted that in most cases the appointment of officials is more likely to be achieve on 
political criteria, given the ruling parties.  
A question that remains is how to explain the elements central to the concept of agency for 
government agencies?  
The concept of disruption of structure applies to ministries being divided into a central body 
and several government agencies that each meet a specific task. Structured change characteristics are 
generally as follows
8: 1. creating a separate organizational structure that can be identified and has its 
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own name, 2. providing a single set of functions or a lower set of functions 3. functions are primarily 
of  delivery,  execution  and  providing,  they  are  less  related  to  policy-making,  4.  establishing  a 
“constitution” in the form of legislation, or at least a framework document which formally specifies 
the  objectives  of  the  organization  and  the  institutional  arrangements  5.  appointment  of  a  chief 
executive responsible for management, 6. differentiation of staff from the majority of civil servants; 
7.establishing  formal  reporting  arrangements  concerning  the  activity  of  the  agency,  including  a 
separate audit.  
In terms of contracting performance government agencies there is to be seen on the one hand 
what is meant by performance and on the other what contracting involves. Performance involves a 
system of targets that are set, and reporting on the work of the agency (which may or may not be 
made public). A noteworthy aspect is that if the proposed targets are not achieved there are likely to 
be discussions, negotiations and consensus if possible, and unlikely to enforce only sanctions (when 
such actions are taken they are usually in regard to the executive chief and not the agency itself). The 
term contract is used in a broad sense, in other words, it is not necessary to have a formal contract. 
Rather, contracting may take the form of any set of performance objectives for the agency, which can 
be self-generated, required or on which an agreement has been reached, and put into a specific 
agreement, contract, plan or a type declaration
9.
The idea of deregulation, or rather re-regulation is one of the most important core elements of 
the concept of agency. To see what re-regulation means in government agencies we have to see why 
it appears and what it means. Regulation requires standard operating procedures and existing rules in 
the  government  apparatus  to  show  how  public  bodies  operate.  Due  to  an  increased  level  of 
regulation,  public organizations are characterized by an excessive bureaucracy (red tape), which 
hampers the management and operation. Creating separate agencies from the central body involves a 
high degree of deregulation. This situation occurs also in regards to the government apparatus and 
creating such agencies leads to a deregulation process. It addresses various functions, including for 
example  personnel,  budget  and  some  management  issues.  Deregulation  may  lead  to  release 
government agencies from the rules enforced by regulatory bodies or central bodies (ministries), or 
both. However, regulation of public administration can not be eliminated, nor can it decrease to a 
certain level without causing difficulties in terms of public accountability, probity or ethics. For this 
reason when it comes to government agencies, there is not so much deregulation, but rather re-
regulation. In this respect, two strategies can be identified: external and internal deregulation. In 
regards to external deregulation, it can be achieved by granting the agency a degree of autonomy. 
The level of autonomy may increase in some cases as it is established in time a certain level of trust 
between agencies and ministries. Regarding domestic deregulation, it may occur within agencies as 
they reach a degree of self-regulation
10.
From  the  discussion  concerning  the  characteristics  and  specific  elements  of  government 
agencies I have emphasized the importance that norms and rules have in creating an agency and in 
the changes that appear when the agency is functioning. Thus, in the process of creating agencies the 
institutions have an exogenous character and after the creation of these agencies there are exogenous 
institutions, but also endogenous ones. The latter appear thanks to a certain degree of autonomy from 
the ministry and self-regulation.  
The work undertaken so far provides the necessary conceptual basis for shaping a model of 
institutional analysis of government agencies.  
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1.2. Institutional analysis of governmental agencies 
Given the considerations above concerning the characteristics and elements of government 
agencies and given the purpose to elaborate a model of institutional analysis it will be necessary to 
follow the preceding steps to achieve this objective.  
A first step is to clarify why I have proposed as a model for the study of government agencies 
institutional one. I started with the idea that modern governance processes occurr within and through 
institutions
11, hence, in order to study government agencies we must understand the institutional 
context. Here I am concerned with the institutional context in which government agencies appear, 
and also with the impact of the changes that take place over time in the institutional context.  
To address the two issues I will begin by clarifying what I understand by the term institution, 
then I will present different neoinstitutionalist approaches. Using these approaches I will explain the 
institutional context in which the process of creating agencies occurs, and then I will present the 
manner in which institutional changes occur in government agencies.  
Regarding the concept of institution, in the literature concerning the term, there are two basic 
meanings given: the first meaning is organization, and the second is rule, norm, practice, routine, 
etc.
12.
For example, from North’s perspective institutions are rules of the game in society or, more 
formally,  they  are  constraints  that  shape  human  interaction
13.  North  distinguishes  between 
institutions and organizations stating that both institutions and organizations provide a structure for 
human  interaction,  but  if  we  follow  the  costs  that  appear  as  consequences  of  the  institutional 
framework, it will show that they are not its results, but those of organizations that have developed as 
a result of the existence of that frame
14.
Another meaning of the term institution is offered by March and Olsen. They define the 
institution as a collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and 
structure of resources, which remain relatively unchanged and relatively resistant to the preferences 
and expectations of individuals and external circumstances
15.
Another conceptualization of the term is given by Ostrom in which the institution relates to 
concepts  shared  by  humans  and  used  in  repetitive  situations,  organized  in  rules,  norms  and 
strategies
16.
Adrian Miroiu argues that different theoretical perspectives focus on one way or another to 
define institutions, hence if institutions are understood as rules, norms, practices, routines, etc. their 
ontological aspect is not yet defined, since an institution can be understood as a real nomative order, 
and also as a symbolic or cognitive one
17 . 
Among the meanings given above I chose to look at the institution as rules, regulations, 
norms, practices, routines.  
 Once  established  the  meaning  given  to  an  institution  I  will  present  some  of  the 
neoinstitutionalist  approaches.  I  will  focus  on  presenting  them  on  three  dimensions,  creating 
institutions, change within institutions and the impact on actors’ behavior. This method will allow a 
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better understanding of the institutional context during the process of agencification, and it will also 
allow an understanding regarding institutional change in this environment. 
“New institutionalism” is a term used increasingly often in political science. Although the 
term new institutionalism is frequently discussed, in particular it is unclear what this means, the 
difference  between  a  neoinstitutionalist  approach  and  other  approaches  that  are  addressing  the 
promises and challenges involved. Many of the new institutionalism ambiguities can be clarified by 
stating that it is not a unified body of thought
18. In this respect, it was noted that various theoretical 
trends specific to the new institutionalism should be viewed as complementary and not competitive 
in terms of explaining political phenomena. None of these perspectives can fully explain all political 
action, nor intend to do so
19.
Different  approaches  claimed  to  be  neoinstititutionalist  ones  can  be  generally  grouped 
according  to  three  schools  of  thought,  namely  historical  institutionalism,  rational  choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.  
Historical  institutionalism  appears  in  response  to  theories  of  politics  and  structural-
functionalist  ones  that  were  specific  to  political  science  in  the  1960’s  and  1970’s  and  borrows 
elements  from  both.  From  group  theory,  historical  institutionalists  accept  the  idea  that  conflict 
between  groups  competing  for  scarce  resources  is  the  center  of  politics.  They  seek  better 
explanations for the distinctions between national political outcomes and inequalities that mark them. 
Historical institutionalism theorists have also found an explanation in the sense that institutional 
economics  and  political organization  structure  conflict  in order  to favor certain  interests and  to 
demobilize others. Historical institutionalists have been influenced by how structural functionalism 
perceive  the  political  arena  as  a  system  of  interacting  parts.  Thus,  they  perceive  institutional 
organization of politics or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behavior 
and generating distinct outcomes
20.
The main argument supported by historical institutionalists refers to the fact that structure and 
policy choices are made during the creation of new institutions and they will have a permanent 
impact on the duration of its existence. Thus, the core principle of this approach is the existence of a 
“path dependency”
21. Under this principle, historical institutionalists view change in the institutional 
environment as highly unlikely
22.
Another aspect worth mentioning is related to the dimension concerning the processes that 
translate the behavior of actors in structure and rules, in that historical developments produce a 
particular set of preferences of actors
23.
Historical institutionalists put considerable emphasis on the contingencies of history. Thus, 
the understanding of individuals in regards to specific events and developments is constrained by the 
important role played by chance
24.
Based on these general assumptions I intend to follow the three dimensions agreed at the 
begining: the creation of institutions, institutional change and the impact on actors’ behavior.  
As seen above, historical institutionalists do not put much emphasis on the manner in which 
institutions are created, but rather their persistence over time. In this context, Peters
25 suggests that 
18 Hall,Peter A., and Taylor,Rosemary C. R.,”Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political 
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2003), 14  
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the emphasis on incorporating ideas into structures that support the institutions can be viewed in 
terms of historical institutionalism as a definition of forming institutions.  
In terms of institutional change, as noted above, it is unlikely. One argument in favor of this 
idea is that all historical institutionalism analysis assume the existence of sustainability over time 
concerning the effects of institutional and political choices. In other words, this approach explains 
better the persistence of patterns, rather than changing them 
26.
Another aspect that is not fully developed in this type of approach is the relationship between 
actors and institutions. Peters suggests that the reason is the implicit assumption made by historical 
institutionalists  that  actors  who  choose to participate  in an  institutional  arrangement accepts the 
constraints imposed by it
27.
The considerations made above show that historical institutionalism does not offer enough 
tools to shape a model of institutional analysis of government agencies. The argument for this idea is 
supported by the presence of obstacles in providing comprehensive explanations both in terms of 
creating institutions and institutional change. Moreover, such an approach is difficult to use because 
it can not provide a clear understanding of the behavior of actors as shown.  
Hence, given the fact that historical institutionalism can not serve in shaping a institutional 
analysis framework for government agencies I will seek to explain the other two types of approaches, 
starting with sociological institutionalism.  
 Sociological institutionalism emphasizes that many institutional forms and procedures used 
by modern organizations have been adopted simply because they were most effective in those tasks. 
Rules and procedures  should be  regarded  as  specific cultural practices,  to  be assimilated in the 
organization, not necessarily to improve the effectiveness of formal results, but as a consequence of 
such processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices. Thus, they argued that the 
apparent bureaucratic practices should be explained in cultural terms
28.
When talking about institutional change in this approach it can be viewed in two ways. Thus, 
institutional  change  is  seen  as  occurring  either  through  institutionalization  or  by  de-
institutionalization. In other words, the process of institutionalization refers to adding more roles or 
features, such as firm adhesion to the prevailing cognitive frames of the institution
29. Another way to 
look at institutional change is adapting to changes in the institutional environment. In this case, the 
challenges  from  the environment  are  recognized  and the  focus  is in  finding ways in  which the 
institution will comply with external forces
30.
To see how the relationship between actors and institutions is seen within this approach I will 
start with the following statement: central to sociological institutionalism is the idea that action is 
closely linked to interpretation. Thus, when faced with a situation, one must find a way to recognize 
and respond to it, because there are default patterns in the institutional environment that provide the 
means to achieve this task. The relationship between individual and institution is built on a type of 
practical reasoning in which the actor uses existing patterns of action
31.
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A neoinstitutionalist perspective with roots in sociological institutionalism is that of March 
and Olsen, but it is rather considered belonging to a normative institutionalism approach. I chose to 
mention it, since its considerations are important. Thus, the two authors argue that there are two basic 
assumptions in the institutional approach. The first assumption is that institutions create elements of 
order and predictability. In other words, institutions shape, constrain and enable political actors to act 
in a “logic of the most appropriate action”. The second assumption is that translating structures into 
political  action  and  actions  that  lead  to  continuity  and  institutional  change  are  generated  by 
comprehensible  routine  processes.  These  processes  produce  recurring  modes  of  action  and 
organizational patterns
32.
Institutional change in March and Olsen’s approach is not necessarily when there are external 
forces. Rather, there is internal pressure that can lead to institutional change, sustainable due to gaps 
between  ideals  and  institutional  practices.  In  addition,  change  may  be  governed  by  rules, 
institutionalized in specific units or sub-units,  or it can  be generated by interpreting routines or 
implementating rules
33 .
Another  aspect  worth  mentioning  is  the  relationship  between  actors  and  institutions.  To 
understand this relationship, the authors stress that institutions provide codes of behavior. Thus, they 
believe  that rules  and practices specify what  are  the  expectations and  what makes sense in the 
community
34 .
Given  the  considerations  above,  we  can  say  that  sociological  institutionalism  approaches 
could provide a basis for shaping a model of institutional analysis of government agencies. However, 
I  believe  that  such  an  approach  would  face  some  difficulties.  First,  considering  the  rules  and 
procedures as specific cultural practices does not allow analyzing government agencies in countries 
in the process of democratization, since there is not a prima facie case in such practices. Another 
argument  is  related  to  the  assumption  that  rules  and  procedures  that  are  to  be  assimilated  into 
organizations do not necessarily aim at improving the efficiency of the formal results, hence this 
assumption does not match the reality of government agencies. The reason is connected to one of the 
features mentioned regarding agencies, namely contracting performance. Thus, for example in a 
public agency whose task is reglementation, the assimilation of rules and procedures imply efficiency 
in terms of formal results. Hence, it is difficult to use this approach in building the analysis model 
proposed.  
A third neoinstitutionalist approach is rational choice institutionalism. Institutional rational 
choice assumes that institutions are constructed by individual actors in the pursuit of rational goals 
and that these actors are involved in shaping and changing the institutional environment to serve their 
purpose
35. Actors are seen as rational individuals with a fixed set of preferences and behave entirely 
instrumental in choosing the best alternative to achieve these preferences in a strategic manner. Thus, 
an actor's behavior is the result of a strategic calculus. This calculation is affected by the actor’s 
expectations  in  relation  to  the  behavior  of  other  actors.  Institutions  shape  such  interactions  by 
determining the structure and sequence of the alternatives available to the individual or by providing 
information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce the uncertainty regarding the behavior of other 
actors
36.
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Rational choice institutionalism features several perspectives, including models which explain 
institutions based on the principal-agent relationship, on game theory and models of institutions 
based on rules. Although different, these perspectives present a number of similarities: a common set 
of assumptions and the fact that they all starts from tabula rasa
37 . 
In respect to the set of common assumptions, they are: 1. individuals are the central actors in 
the political process; 2. individuals act rationally to maximize their utility, 3. institutions are an 
aggregation of rules that shape individual behavior, 4. individuals react rationally to the incentives 
and constraints set by these rules, 5. most actors are expected to respond in the same fashion to 
similar incentives
38.
Regarding the fact that all of these perspectives start from tabula rasa, this assumption refers 
to the fact that the formation of institutions does not depend on past institutions or organizations. The 
result of the institutional design is determined by the nature of the incentives and constraints
39 . 
In order to gain a better understanding of these perspectives I will present them briefly below.  
Principal-agent models are based on the idea that interactions between individuals can be seen 
from  this  perspective,  but  can  also  be  used  in  relation  to  the  organizations  as  a  means  of 
understanding  the  interaction  between  groups  of  public  sector  institutions.  An  example  are  the 
studies on the budget of a public organization, where the the top official can operate as an agent for 
the  bureau
40.  Such  a  model  is  quite  difficult  to  use  in  shaping  a  framework  of  analysis  for 
government agencies. Although it offers a better understanding of the interaction between actors, this 
model does not provide the analytical tools needed to study institutional design in the creation of 
agencies and provides minimal knowledge on their behavior of bureaucrats within the office except 
the for officials who could be regarded as agents in relation to the ministry under which the agency is 
located.  
Game theory type models are based on the issues of compliance with rules and regulations. 
Game theory suggests a set of strategic choices (games) in which actors seek to ensure compliance 
by other actors they interact with, usually bureaucrats who are considered to be seeking a higher 
degree of freedom in their actions. The problem of those who are designing this game is to build an 
array of incentives to ensure the compliance of the bureaucrats. It is also necessary to find a solution 
to the problem of ensuring the compliance of the actors to their part in this arrangement. If this game 
is played only once desertion and non-compliance do not involve very high costs for any of the 
actors. To establish better cooperation between the actors and a greater degree of compliance game 
must be repeated several times
41.
Shepsle argues that models using game theory have some problems in regard to institutions. 
This approach has focused primarily on how the structure of the game affects the choices of the 
players,  and  only  secondarily  on  the  process  by  which  equilibrium  outcomes  are  reached  (the 
institution  is  an  expression  of  equilibrium).  Of  course  there  are  important  exceptions  such  as 
Axelrod
42,  Shepsle
43,  Shepsle  and  Weingast
44.  Thus,  in  most  analysis  using  game  theory  the 
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institutional arrangements are given, and the objective is simply to study the implications of those 
rules on the behavior and results. Secondly, the temporal persistence of the rules is not considered as 
part of the game because they are regarded as exogenous
45. The main impediment is the difficulty of 
establishing the preferences of the actors involved in the formation of government agencies. Given 
these  impediments,  we  considered  that  this  model  is  not  one  that  can  be  used  in  shaping  the 
analytical framework of the agencies.  
Models which view institutions as rules  are based on the idea that rules are  a means to 
prescribe, permit and constrain behavior. In this case institutions are regarded as the aggregation of 
rules, and member organizations agree to comply with them in exchange for the benefits they obtain 
as part of the structure. In this model rationality is distinguished by the fact that individuals can gain 
benefits from membership and are therefore willing to sacrifice certain latitude for their actions in 
exchange for these benefit. Among the most important of these benefits is a remarkable degree of 
predictability of the behavior of other actors
46. Of the three models presented until now I think it has 
the potential to help in shaping the analytical framework of governmental agencies, as it allows easier 
handling  of  issues  relating  to  development  and  change  within  institutions,  unlike  the  first  two 
perspectives which were mainly concerned with the interaction between actors and institutions. In 
consequence I will pursue the two issues in terms of rational choice institutionalism.  
Regarding the emergence of institutions, Peters claims that they do not appear automatically 
because they are needed, but they have to be created 
47.
Concerning institutional change the rational choice institutionalism perspective stipulates that 
an institution undergoes changes that are both endogenous and exogenous. Transformations that 
occur  endogenously  appear  when  rules  and  procedures  are  changed  in  a  previously  established 
manner, and exogenously when this happens as a result of an external factor or when there is a 
sudden change in the institutional environment
48.
From these arguments it results that the rational choice institutional approach has the potential 
to  create a  framework for the analysis  of government agencies.  The problem  is  that  theoretical 
approach was shown to have potential to shape the analytical framework not in its entirety, but only 
through its general assumptions and models.  
Given this situation we decided to follow the perspective of Krehbiel Diermier who propose 
viewing institutionalism as a methodology. The two authors state that institutionalism should guide 
the investigation as to which of a  multitude of  more or less stable features, which  characterize 
collective  choice  arrangements  are  essential  in  understanding  the  behavior  and  outcomes  of 
collective action
49. In this respect, the authors suggest a method in four steps
50:
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2. Formal characterization of existing institutions;  
3. Deduction of the behavior that occurs in institutional arrangements, taking into account the 
assumptions regarding behavior and the characterization of the effects of said behavior;
4. The derived implications must be evaluated using empirical data.  
This perspective is perhaps most useful in analyzing the behavior of bureaucratic government 
agencies because it allows both the use of an institutional approach to explaining the context, but also 
a model of bureaucratic behavior in that context.  
The way in which institutions emerge and change is important because as we suggested in the 
beginning, the emergence of the institutional arrangements of government agencies is exogenous – it 
is represented by legal rules which create the  government agencies and establish rules for their 
operation – while, in time, the internal rules of agencies are defined without external intervention. 
Thus,  conducting  an  analysis  of  the  institutional  processes  of  government  agencies  offers  an 
explanation of the changes taking place within them. This approach is needed to complete the second 
step of the method proposed by Diermier and Krehbiel.  
Once  acquired  this  knowledge  to  create  a  framework  for  analyzing  the  behavior  of 
bureaucrats in government agencies it will be necessary to expose the assumptions on the behavior 
given  the  existing  institutional  arrangement.  In  this  regard,  it will  be  necessary  to  start  from  a 
bureaucratic model.  
Thus, in what follows I will present various bureaucratic models and I will choose one that 
corresponds to the collective choice arrangement given, namely the government agency. 
2. Approaches to bureaucracy: models of bureaucratic behavior analysis 
In order to asses bureaucratic behavior in government agencies I have chosen to use the 
organizational  and  public  choice  perspectives  on  bureaucracy,  and  will  discuss  possible general 
models of analysis.  
One of the most important theoretical models of the organizational approach was developed 
by Max Weber in his theory of bureaucracy. This approach rests on ideal types, meaning that it lists 
the  abstract  or  ideal  characteristics  of  a  bureaucratic  organization.  The  model  of  bureaucracy 
proposed by Weber is based on the concept of authority. There are three types of authority according 
to the author: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. Charismatic authority means that the power 
of a leader is based on his extraordinary ability to attract supporters and to interact with them. This 
type  of  authority  is  very  unstable  as  it  can  disappear  if  the  followers  are  disappointed  by  the 
charismatic leader. Charismatic authority can be observed in certain religious cults where one person 
draws supporters and requests their obedience by the force of his personality. The foundation of 
traditional  authority  is  a  set  of  persistent  beliefs  about  who  should  be  in  control  and  is  often 
associated with certain positions within an organizational hierarchy. The best example is monarchies, 
where the king or queen’s power in derived from tradition and not from their skills, actions or 
behavior. Rational-legal authority designates power based on the rational application of a set of rules 
constructed by reference to information and expertise. In the case of rational-legal authority power 
belongs to the individual whose hierarchical position of authority is a direct result of the law and of 
the rules designed in compliance with the law
51.
Max Weber writes that "each holder of power is legitimated by rational norms and his power 
is legitimate insofar as it meets the standard. Obedience is to the norm rather than to the person"
52.
Weber proposes six principles for the bureaucratic systems derived from the concept of rational-legal 
authority, as follows:  
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1. Authority is derived from the law and the rules designed in compliance with the law.  
2. The principle of a clearly defined hierarchy. This principle refers to the existence of a clear 
system of subordination where the higher hierarchical levels control the lower levels. 
3.  Bureaucracy  is  a  relatively  closed  system.  Where  possible,  the  bureaucracy  must  be 
isolated from external environmental influences, given that external disturbances can adversely affect 
its operation. Furthermore, bureaucracy is an impersonal system, separate from the private life of its 
employees. The administration of the bureau is based on written documents which are kept. The 
persons in public office, together with the necessary equipment and documents constitute a bureau. 
Public  funds  and  the  equipment  needed  for  bureaucratic  activities  are  distinct  from  the  private 
property of the person who performs a public function.  
4. Bureaucratic activity requires specialized education.  
5. Bureaucratic activity is a career and not a secondary activity.  
6. The administration of the bureau follows general rules which are stable and comprehensive. 
Knowledge of these rules is a special type of technical education which a bureaucrat possesses.  
In short, the bureaucracy in Weber's vision is a system based on impersonal rules.  
The main criticisms of the model of bureaucratic organization proposed by Weber come from 
public choice approaches and were formulated by theorists such as Downs, Niskanen and Dunleavy. 
According to the standard assumptions of the theory of rational choice bureaucrats seek to maximize 
their utility or, more precisely, will seek more power, prestige and security, or a higher income by 
using  the  hierarchical  structure  for  their  own  benefit,  in  detriment  of  the  organization’s  goals. 
Weber’s model is based on the assumption that bureaucrats are not interested in financial gain and 
are  motivated  by  ideals  such  as  service  to  the  state.  From  the  perspective  of  rational  choice 
assumptions this type of behavior is illogical
53. Rational choice theorists believes that maximizing 
individual  utility  (individual  ambition)  may  lead  to  results  that  are  not  in  the  interest  of  the 
organization.  Niskanen
54  (1973)  argues  that  individual  ambition  leads  to  each  bureau  trying  to 
maximize its budget. Thus, bureaucrats’ personal benefits will increase if they are part of a bureau 
which obtains a larger budget because a budget increase can be translated into increases in salaries, 
public reputation, power and number of employees
55.
Such an interpretation may explain why high-level bureaucrats tend to always request more 
resources for the structures they head. In turn, Ostrom believes that bureaucratic organization is 
ineffective because large bureaucracies: a) impose ever higher social costs on the beneficiaries, b) fail 
to adjust supply to demand, c) allow for the degradation of public goods because they fail to stop the 
process by which using a public good for one purpose prevents it from being used for other purposes, 
d) are becoming increasingly prone to errors and uncontrollable to the point that their actions deviate 
dramatically compared to the rhetoric on public objectives and e) can lead to situations where an 
action aimed at improving a situation actually exacerbates the problem
56.
Another approach regarding bureaucratic behavior is the one based on the assumptions of 
rational choice theory. One model of bureaucratic behavior which follows this approach is that of 
Anthony Downs. The author presents the bureau as a particular form of organization where the 
organization  is  seen  as  a  system  of  consciously  coordinated  activities  that  has  been  created 
specifically to achieve certain goals. An organization is a bureau in Downs's perspective if it has four 
basic features:  
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1. it is large, in other words members of the highest levels know less than half of the staff 
members;  
2. the majority of the employees work full time and depend on their job in the bureau for most 
of their revenue;  
3. the hiring, promotion and retention of the staff is based, at least formally, on a technical 
evaluation  regarding  their  performance  or  their  expected  performance  given  the  role  they  are 
expected to perform in the bureau rather than on predetermined criteria (religion, race, social class, 
etc..) or as a result of periodic elections by an external body;  
4. The output of the bureau is not, for the most part, directly or indirectly assessed in open 
markets by means of voluntary quid pro quo transactions
57.
With this operationalization of the concept of the bureau, Downs defines a bureaucrat not 
only as a person working in a bureau, but rather as a person working for a large organization, who 
receives a salary from the organization – which represents most of his revenue - who is employed, 
promoted and maintained within the organization on the basis of his performance of his assigned 
task, and who produces results that can not be assessed on the market
58.
Downs' argument starts from the assumption that bureaucrats, like any other actors in society, 
are mostly motivated by their personal interests
59. Following this assumption the author proposes 
three main hypothesis. The first hypothesis states that all bureaucrats seek to achieve their objectives 
in a rational manner, in other words the most efficient manner, given their limited capacity and the 
cost of information. Thus, bureaucrats seek to maximize utility. The second hypothesis refers to the 
fact that bureaucrats have a complex set of objectives which include items such as power, income, 
prestige, safety, loyalty (to an idea, institution, etc..), serving the public interest. The last hypothesis 
concerns  the  fact  that  the  internal  structure  and  behavior  of  each  bureau  is  closely  linked  to 
interactions  with  the  environment,  each  of  these  being  interlinked  with  the  other
60.  The  three 
hypothesis  proposed  by  the  author  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  when  it  comes  to  analyzing 
bureaucratic behavior the institutional context in which they operate should be investigated. Thus, 
one  must  take into account  the fact that bureaucrats  seeks to  maximize utility, the internal and 
external constraints on the bureaucrat’s behavior as well as the impact of bureaucratic behavior on 
the office
61.
Another perspective on bureaucratic behavior is offered by Niskanen within the theory which 
describes the supply of goods and services by bureaus. According to the author bureaus are defined 
as those organizations that have both of the following characteristics: 1. employers and employees in 
these organizations  shall  not  acquire  any  part  of  the difference  between  revenues and  costs for 
personal  gain;  2.  part  of  the  organization's  income  results  from  sources  other  than  the  sale  of 
outputs
62 (Niskanen, 1994:15). In other words, the perspective proposed by Niskanen sees the bureau 
as a non-profit organization which is funded in part by loans or regular grants. The bureaucrat is 
thought to be a full time employee in a bureau, wether he is a public sector professional or directly 
appointed by the executive
63.
The approach proposed by Niskanen focuses on the relationship between the bureau and the 
environment,  namely  the  governmental  sector,  and  the  consequences of  this  relationship on the 
bureau’s budget and outcomes. The author points out that bureaus are specialized in producing goods 
and services in large quantities rather than demand per unit product (Niskanen ,1994:15-18). His 
argument is that bureaucrats try to maximize the total budget of the office during their leadership. 
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The budget is subject to the constraint that it must be equal to or greater than the minimum total cost 
of supply as compared to the results expected by the body which finances the bureau
64.
The bureau shaping theory proposed by Patrick Dunleavy is built in opposition to the budget 
maximizing  model  proposed  by  William  Niskanen.  Dunleavy  starts  from  the  assumption  that 
bureaucrats seek to maximize their personal utility when making official decisions. The general 
policy of a bureau is defined by a combination of individual decisions made by senior bureaucrats 
who act in it and their interaction with the structure the agency is subordinated to (interactions with 
the sponsor body). In general, the policy influence of the officials of the bureau is significantly 
structured according to rank, so that officials holding top-level positions will be the most influential. 
Structures acting as principal (sponsors) will depend to a considerable extent on the bureau (agent) in 
relation to information about the costs, benefits and results of the bureau, although they receive some 
general information from the public.  
There are four reasons why rational bureaucrats should not act to maximize the budget: a) the 
collective  action  problems  within  bureaucracies  have  a  considerable  influence  on  the  general 
behavior of the office, b) the extent to which the utility of the bureaucrats is associated with an 
increased budget varies depending on the different components of the overall budget and according 
to different types of agents, c) even if some bureaucrats act in order to maximize the budget, this 
process will continue only until an optimum level is reached and d) high-level bureaucrats try to 
maximize  the  utility  of  the  type  of  tasks  they  carry  out  (work-related  utilities)  rather  than  the 
financial utility, in which case collective strategies for the remodeling of the bureau in which they 
work  into  other  types  of structures  (agencies)  may  be  the  best  alternative  to  achieve  this  goal. 
Whether high-level bureaucrats choose the modeling strategy or strategies to maximize the bureau’s 
budget systematically vary depending on the type of bureaucratic structure
65.
Reasons for bureau shaping  
Senior officials (who are in hierarchical positions where they can influence the policies of the 
bureau) acting to maximize their own welfare are mainly interested in securing a prestigious working 
environment and pleasant tasks for three reasons. The first reason is that high-level officials are less 
interested in financial components (income, job security) than lower-level officials, this is a general 
assumption of public choice literature. High-level officials are more interested in maximizing utility 
and non-financial status, prestige, influence and, in particular, the importance and interesting nature 
of the work they perform. Secondly, the design of the public sector imposes severe limits on the 
ability  of  officials  to  increase  their  financial  utility  (income)  by  using  individual  or  collective 
strategies, whether it is the budget maximizing strategy or the use of discretionary funds for personal 
interest. The amount received as a salary is restricted by the use of a standardized cap. Thus, in public 
administration there are no consistent bonuses equivalent to the ones provided to the leadership of 
private  corporations.  In  addition,  general  limitations  imposed  on  the  number  of  employees, 
centralized auditing systems, the prohibition of economic activities and the structure of careers are 
features that reduce the ability of government officials to pursue individual financial interests. 
Similarly, non-financial but related benefits, such as company cars or equipment are also 
strictly controlled
66. The third reason is the fact that utility maximization regarding the inherent 
characteristics of the tasks seems to be a major influence on how the bureaucracy works. 
There is sufficient evidence that self-interested bureaucrats have strong preferences about the 
work they want to perform and the type of agency they want to work in. Clearly, there is a financial 
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component of the agenda of officials, an income level they wish to achieve, but there is a high 
probability that this component is not very important for officials which hold positions that allow 
them to make bureau policy decisions. In other words, senior officials have already reached the level 
of income they wanted to achieve so that the importance of this factor decreases the higher the 
hierarchical  position.  Consequently,  rational  officials  want  to  work  in  small,  collegial  and  elite 
bureaus who are close to the centers of political power and not to be in charge of large structures with 
many employees and large budgets, but with routine activities, with a conflictual environment and 
low status
67.
Collective strategies for bureau shaping 
If  officials  want  to  maximize  their  utility  regarding  the  characteristics  of  the  tasks  they 
perform the most effective strategy that is available is that of individual action, that is looking for 
jobs that bring them closer to the desired level and the desired agency. 
However,  once  the  individual  alternatives  are  exhausted  there  are  a  series  of  collective 
strategies that can be used for shaping the bureau in order for it to become an increasingly accurate 
approximation of the type of elite agency, with has a friendly atmosphere and is close to the centers 
of political power. There are five ways to shape a bureau: 
1. Major internal reorganizations. Changing the structure of the bureau on a regular basis may 
increase the degree to which it approaches the ideal of an elite agency that outlines policy directions. 
The number of posts dealing with public policy formulation increases, while the number of lower 
level positions that deal with routine activities is reduced and employees occupying these positions 
are separated from the upper levels. Sometimes this is a geographical separation.  
2. Transforming internal practices. Senior officials (policy-level officials) want to maximize 
their work related utility and to increase their ability to control policies in a discretionary manner. 
The  adoption  of  sophisticated  systems  of  management  and  policy  analysis  (using  electronic 
equipment for routine tasks, statistical models) can protect the bureau from criticism from  rival 
bureaus, external partners and the structure they are subordinated to. There is also the tendency to 
change the composition of the staff, encouraging the employment of specialized professionals with 
technical  expertise,  which  increases  the  agency’s  status  and  improves  the  nature  of  the  tasks 
performed by members. The main feature of this strategy is the automatization or externalization of 
routine tasks allowing the use of staff for policy development tasks. After the completion of these 
changes the officials dealing with policy analysis tend to emphasize the collegial decision-making 
and teamwork methods which results in the dispersal of responsibility. 
3. Redefining the relationship with external partners. In cases where the bureau interacts with 
external  organizations  on  a  regular  basis,  such  as  subordinate  public  agencies,  subcontractors, 
organizations whose activity is regulated by the bureau or interest groups, these relationships can be 
readjusted so that the volume of routine tasks is reduced and the bureau’s control over policy is 
maximized. The bureau tries to minimize its dependence on external organizations given that a high 
volume of control or management tasks can be a risk if the subordinate or external organizations 
refuse to cooperate. Replacing this type of tasks with a control mechanism which protects the bureau 
is usually a priority. 
4. Competition with other bureaus. Bureaus always defend their ability to manage funds for 
subordinate bureaucratic structures. Government agencies at the same level compete with each other 
for responsibilities concerning the administration of lower-level bureaus and public policy areas that 
fit the profile of the agency type they wish to approximate. 
5. Hiring external agents. The most radical alternative available to senior offices who want to 
redefine the functions of their agency comes from their ability to outsource functions inconsistent 
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with  the  ideal  type  of  agency  that  senior  officials  want  to  approximate.  Central  government 
departments may transfer routine functions or activities to local government structures or such tasks 
can be transferred to the quasi-governmental agencies. The auxiliary functions can be outsourced to 
the private sector
68.
I believe that the model of bureaucratic behavior proposed by Dunleavy best fits the given 
collective choice arrangement, namely the government agency. One argument for this is that he 
refers to bureaus that have similar characteristics to those of governmental agencies. For example, in 
this model he shows that rational officials want to work in small, collegial and elite bureaus that are 
close  to  the  centers  of  political  power  and  not  to  be  in  charge  of  large  structures  with  many 
employees and large budgets . This shows that the model can be applied to government agencies. The 
argument is that we can draw a parallel between the small, collegiate and elite bureau, that is not 
necessarily close to the main governmental hierarchy and the government agency which is usually 
positioned  further  away  from  the  hierarchical  structure  of  the  central  ministries  and  state 
departments. Another issue concerns the fact that self-interested bureaucrats have strong preferences 
regarding the type of work they want to perform and the type of agency they want to work in. This 
feature can be correlated with the fact that government agencies carry out public tasks at the national 
level.  
In addition, the bureaus for which Dunleavy suggests this model are state financed and civil 
servants are employed, features also present in the case of government agencies.  
3.  Challenges  in  studying  agencification and  bureaucratic behaviour  in  Central  and 
Eastern Europe 
In terms of studying the agencification process in Central and Eastern Europe states there 
were difficulties regarding change in the government apparatus. To highlight this situation we should 
consider  a  brief  description  of  the  transition  from  a  communist  to  a  democratic  regime  in  the 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. It should be noted that the transition led to the significant 
changes on several fronts. On the one hand, the transition to a market economy led to significant 
changes  in  the  structure  and  nature  of  the  state,  especially  concerning  privatization  of  public 
enterprises and also a public policy shift towards economic reform. On the other hand, there are 
political  changes  accompanying  the  process  of  democratization.  In  this  context,  concerns  for 
economic and political reforms have prevailed in relation to achieving change in the government 
apparatus itself, particularly in relation to public administration. One argument in favor of this idea is 
offered by Barbara Nunberg who claims that public administration reforms have occurred at a much 
lower  rate,  a  possible  reason  being  the  reluctance  of  foreign  investors  in  supporting  external 
programs to strengthen administrative capacity. This was largely due to the fact that attention was 
focused in particular on accelerating economic reforms, but also to some extent the appearance of a 
wave of anti-statist response to delegitimization of the communist state69.  
In this context, in the countries from Central and Eastern Europe there are significant changes 
ocuring during the ongoing democratization process, these changes being incremental in nature. At 
the same time, there is the need to increase capacity for policy formulation and implementation of 
programs to strengthen and maintain the results produced by the aforementioned reforms. To achieve 
this goal the interest shifted towards producing changes in the government apparatus, specifically in 
regard to the transition from a centralized bureaucracy to a modern, efficient and focused one based 
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69Nunberg,  Barbara.  Barbone,  Luca.  Derlien,  Hans-Ulrich,  The  state  after  communism:  administrative 
transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (World Bank regional and sectoral studies, 1999), 1. 1754  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
on performance70. From these considerations it is noted that in order to propose an analytical model 
of  bureaucratic  behavior  in  the  governmental  sector  it  will  be  required  to  draw  a  clear  and 
comprehensive view regarding the institutional environment and the processes and transformations 
that occur within it. 
  Taking these into account it is necessary to follow the emergence of government agencies 
and the specifics of this process in Central and Eastern Europe states.  
First, as mentioned above the changes in the government apparatus were performed in a 
slower pace during the process of democratization. Secondly, a large part of public organizations in 
these countries inherited legal personality since the communist regime, which resulted in procedural 
and formal consequences. In these circumstances, the creation of government agencies in Central and 
Eastern Europe involved the creation of new autonomous organizations to respond to new functions, 
but also a significant increase in legally separate autonomous.
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The challenge of studying the behavior of bureaucrats in government agencies from countries 
in  the  process  of  democratization  in  these  circumstances  is  twofold.  While  there  is  a  series  of 
empirical research embodied in case studies concerning government agencies in some countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Beblavy, 2002, Pollitt, Talbot, 2004; Pollitt, Talbot, Caufield, Smullen, 
2005, Van Thiel & CRIPO team, 2009, Hajnal, 2010), they focus primarily on providing research 
tools and methods and less on shaping a clear and comprehensive theoretical framework. For this 
reason, the challenges of such a study leads to highlighting the similarities and differences in creating 
agencies between democratic states in relation to the ones in the process of democratization. Through 
this method there will be provided a better understanding of the complexity of the institutional 
environment. Moreover, such challenge of sketching a theoretical framework and outline a model 
involving the analysis of bureaucratic behavior will become more clearly defined. 
Considering the challenges presented above in studying bureaucratic behaviour in agencies in 
Central and Eastern Europe states I consider that the method developed in this paper has a real 
potential. An argument in this sense is that by developing a institutional analysis framework for 
studying bureaucratic behaviour there are several aspects covered. First, it offers a strategy to create a 
formal characterization of the existing institutions in government agencies in general. Second, by 
viewing institutions as rules, norms and procedures it helps to highlight the institutional arrangements 
in the moment of creating the agency and the changes that occur in time. An important aspect 
possible to be observed is the process of auto-regulation which appears when agencies obtain a 
certain  degree  of  autonomy.  Hence,  the  approach  suggested  outlines  exogenous  institutional 
arrangements and how they shape the agencies when they are created and also endogenous ones 
which are established during the lifespan of the agency. These dimensions are important in tackling 
the challenges presented above in studying agencies from Central and Eastern Europe states.
Conclusions 
This  study  shows  that  in  order  to  create  a  framework  for  analyzing  the  behavior  of 
bureaucratic governmental agencies two steps need to be taken. 
A  first  step  is  the  formal  characterization  of  the  existing  institutions  within  government 
agencies. We have shown that it can be done by using the rational choice institutionalism type 
approaches. From this approach we found that the model which defines institutions as based on rules 
as having the best potential in characterizing the institutional context which corresponds with the 
formation and operation of government agencies. 
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A second step regards the choice of a bureaucratic model that can be used in explaining 
bureaucratic behavior in government agencies, taking into account the institutional context in which 
they are placed. Completion of this approach has led  to exposure in the behavior postulates on 
collective choice arrangement gives (government agencies). 
In  conclusion,  to  draw  up  a  comprehensive  framework  for  the  analysis  of  bureaucratic 
behavior  in  government  agencies  is  necessary  to  rely  on  a  method  to  consider  institutional 
arrangements as they occur and at a later stage of their operation, but to consider and a bureaucratic 
model to answer this question on the influence of institutional context to the internal and external 
rules of bureaucratic behavior. 
The implications of using an institutional framework for analyzing government agencies in 
Central and Eastern Europe states are as suggested in the third section of the paper that the researcher 
is offered a comprehensive strategy in studying bureaucratic behavior. Also, the study shows that the 
challenges presented by researching bureaucratic behavior in agencies in Central and Eastern Europe 
states and the difficulties in finding common ground in this area are better faced if we are equipped 
with theoretical and methodological tools from an institutionalist perspective.  
In this respect, as mentioned at the beginning of the paper, developing an institutional analysis 
framework in studying bureaucratic behavior in government agencies is a step for a future research 
concerning  public  accountability  and  bureaucratic  behavior  in  agencies  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe. Hence, this study represents the foundation on which there will be conducted the research 
mentioned, that will put an emphasis on institutional arrangements and how they affect bureaucratic 
behavior in terms of public accountability.  
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